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GENUINELY DISTRESSING: ILLINOIS'
FAILURE TO ALLOW A CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR EMOTIONAL INJURIES
CAUSED BY NEGLIGENT MISHANDLING
OF A CORPSE
KEVIN E. BRY*
INTRODUCTION

A family contracts with a funeral home to have a deceased family member cremated. To help overcome its grief, the family plans a

trip to distribute the ashes in the Gulf of Mexico. The funeral home
delivers the ashes; the family makes the trip and carries out the seaside ceremony. The family later finds to its dismay that the funeral
home negligently delivered someone other than their loved one's
ashes.'
A family contracts with a funeral home for the wake and funeral
of a deceased family member. At the wake, to the family's horror,
fluid begins to ooze from the decedent's mouth. The mortician arrives and attempts to correct the problem with the corpse. When the
wake resumes, however, the decedent has a grimace on his face, and
the decedent's arms begin to free-float above his body.2
In Illinois, neither of these grieving families have a cause of action for emotional distress based upon the funeral home's or mortician's negligent mishandling of their loved one's corpse. The purpose of this article is to argue that Illinois courts should allow such a
cause of action. After a brief history of the tort of negligently inflicted emotional distress,' this article will review this tort's development in Illinois." This article will then examine case law and policy
* J.D., The John Marshall Law School; Judicial clerk to the Honorable Thomas
E. Hoffman, Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
1. The facts from this example are taken from a case reported in a Florida
newspaper. Palm Beach Post, Dec. 7, 1988, at 4a, col. 1.
2. The facts of this example are taken from the case of Doe v. Lamb, No. 88 L
16692 (1st Dist. Ill. filed September 8, 1988).
3. See infra notes 8-25 and accompanying text (historical perspective ranging
from denial of recovery for emotional injuries to the recognition of the "impact rule,"
and the evolution of the foreseeability test).
4. See infra notes 26-43 and accompanying text (tracing Illinois' law in its parallel to the historical perspective, but which falls short of the foreseeability test).
5. See infra notes 44-64 and accompanying text (tracing case law on tortious
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considerations.' Finally, the article will propose that Illinois make
an exception to its existing rules of recovery in an action for negligently inflicted emotional distress and allow actions in the area of
corpse mishandling?
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORT

Initially, American courts agreed that damages could not be
awarded for emotional injuries resulting from negligent acts.' One
nineteenth century case reasoned that injury could be feigned too
easily in such a case.' Another nineteenth century case reasoned
that damages were too remote and "metaphysical" in such a case.'"
An early Illinois case warned "dangerous use might be made of such
a claim.""
At the same time, however, courts began allowing claims for
emotional injuries where the tort involved appeared to be an intentional tort. For example, in an influential British case, the court allowed damages where a practical joker told a woman that her husband was injured in a serous accident. 12 In other cases, courts
fashioned liability for emotional damages based on more traditional
liability, such as battery, false imprisonment and trespass to land.' 3
Allowing recovery for emotional damages where the conduct was
mishandling of a corpse).
6. See infra notes 65-76 and accompanying text (policy arguments ranging from
avoiding a flood of litigation to inability to prove injury).
7. There are a number of other situations where, due to special circumstances,
one might argue that Illinois should make exceptions to general rules of recovery in
this area. For instance, a similar argument can be made where there is negligent notification of death or harm by telegraph or otherwise. However, as change in this area
of the law has come slowly in Illinois, it is advocated here that a first exception be
made in the area of corpse mismanagement alone. Other exceptions may eventually
be made, and Illinois may in the end adopt a foreseeability proposal. See infra notes
22-25, 66 and accompanying text (further discussion of these ideas).
8. American courts' early positions on the subject are illustrated by this
passage:
The body, reputation, and property of the citizen are not to be involved without responsibility in damages to the sufferer. But outside these protected
spheres, the law does not yet attempt to guard the peace of mind. . . .The law
leaves feeling to be helped and indicated by the tremendous force of sympathy.
Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 88 Ga. 763, 772, 15 S.E. 901, 903 (1892) (plaintiff could not recover for emotional distress where telegraph company did not deliver
message of plaintiff's brother's illness prior to brother's death).
9. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled Williams v. New York, 308 N.Y. 558, 127 N.E.2d 545 (1955)(finding it possible to recover
from injury "occasioned by fright").
10. Connell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 116 Mo. 34, 22 S.W. 345 (1893).
11. Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 420, 51 N.E. 657, 664 (1898).
12. Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q.B.D. 57 (1887).
13. Engle v. Simmons, 148 Ala. 92, 41 So. 1023 (1906) (trespass to land); De
May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881) (battery); Salisbury v. Poulson, 51
Utah 552, 172 P. 315 (1918) (false imprisonment).
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outrageous or involved an independent intentional tort, served a punitive function aimed at deterring undesirable conduct. 4
The major breakthrough in the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress occurred when American courts, following an English case,'" adopted the "impact rule." Under this rule, recovery of
damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress is available
where the event causing the distress involved contemporaneous
physical impact to the plaintiff. 6 Dissatisfaction with this rule soon
developed, however, when courts began allowing causes of action
where the impact involved was very minor.' 7
Many jurisdictions then switched to a new test, the "zone of
danger" test. Under this test, a plaintiff could recover if she witnessed a tort committed upon another, exhibited manifestations of
injury, and feared for her own safety."8 However, critics argued that
this test was arbitrary 9 and too difficult to satisfy.20 Further, the
test led to unjust results, such as where recovery was denied to a
mother who witnessed a truck strike her infant child.2 '
In the 1968 case of Dillon v. Legg, 2 the California Supreme
Court abandoned the zone of danger test. In Dillon, a negligent
driver struck and killed a minor. The child's mother and sister witnessed the accident, but only the sister was in the zone of danger,
and hence the mother could not recover.2" The Dillon court reasoned that the focus in such a case should not be on whether the
plaintiff was in a zone of danger, but rather on whether the defendant could reasonably foresee that defendant's negligence would
14.
15.

See G. WHITE, TORT LAW

IN AMERICA, XVI, 155, 164, 181,231, 237-39 (1980).
See Victorial Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (1883).

16. There were two American cases which adopted the impact rule very early.
See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) overruled Battalia v.
New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961) (deciding there could be "recovery
for injuries, physical or mental, incurred by fright negligently induced); Spade v.
Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
For a good discussion of the early years of the law of negligent infliction of emo-

tional distress, see Morris v. Lackawanna & West Virginia R.R., 228 Pa. 198, 77 A.
445 (1910)(impact rule recognized as settled law).
17. See, e.g., Christy Bros. Circus v. Turange, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680
(1928)(horse defecated in plaintiff's lap); Morton v. Stock, 122 Ohio 115, 170 N.E. 869
(1930) (speck of dust in plaintiff's eye).
18. The leading American case is Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W.
497 (1935)(mother saw negligent driver drive into and fatally injure daughter).

19. For a discussion of arbitrary rules, see Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for
Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm - Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules,
34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477 (1982).
20.

See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 54 (5th ed. 1984).

21. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P. 2d 513, 29
Cal. Reptr. 33 (1963).
22. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
23. Id. at 732, 441 P.2d at 951, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
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cause plaintiff emotional distress.2 4 The court formulated the following guidelines to determine whether a bystander's emotional distress
is foreseeable: 1) whether the plaintiff was near the scene of the accident; 2) whether the shock resulted from direct emotional impact
upon the plaintiff from observance of the accident; and 3) whether
the plaintiff and the victim were closely related.25 Since Dillon,
many jurisdictions have switched to a foreseeability test, although
the zone of danger test is still the majority rule.
ILLINOIS LAW ON EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

In the early years of Illinois history, whether a court could allow
emotional distress damages was unclear. In an 1858 decision, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that recovery for negligently caused
emotional distress would be allowed where there was pain and suffering parasitic to contemporaneous physical injury. 26 In 1870, however, the court announced that mental suffering was not a recognizable element of damages. Two years later, the Illinois Supreme
Court returned to 2 8the position that pain and suffering damages
could be recovered.

In the 1898 case of Brown v. Craven,29 Illinois formally adopted
the impact rule. The court in Brown ruled that a plaintiff could not
recover for physical injury that developed because of emotional distress unless the plaintiff received either physical injury or some impact to plaintiff's person at the occurrence of the tort.30 The court
stating that it
thus joined what was by then the majority position,
31
did so "on the ground of public policy alone."

Illinois courts continued to apply the impact rule for over eighty
years, until 1983, when it adopted the new majority rule: the zone of
danger test as an exception to the requirement of physical impact.
In the case of Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2 a boy witnessed his brother strangled to the point of coma when the brother's
scarf became caught in a subway escalator.3 The plaintiff alleged
that witnessing this injury caused him severe emotional distress, and
the Illinois Supreme Court agreed that the complaint stated a cause
of action even in the absence of allegation of physical impact. The
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 738, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
Peoria Bridge Ass'n v. Loomis, 20 Ill. 235 (1858).
Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Sutton, 53 11. 397 (1870).
Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Stables, 62 Il1. 313 (1872).
175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898).
Id. at 413, 51 N.E. at 661-62.
Id. at 420, 51 N.E. at 664.
98 11. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983).
Id. at 549, 457 N.E.2d at 2.
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court, restricting its holding to cases involving bystanders witnessing
injury to a close relative, ruled that a plaintiff must be in "such
proximity to the accident. . .that there was a high risk to him of
physical impact. ' 34 Additionally, the bystander plaintiff "must show
physical injury or illness as a result of the emotional distress caused
by the defendant's negligence."3 "
Illinois courts have strictly construed the Rickey zone of danger
test. For instance, in Villamil v. Elmhurst Memorial Hospital,
where death resulted when a new-born infant fell to the floor immediately after delivery, the mother was denied recovery. 36 Villamil
failed the Rickey requirement of high risk to the complaining individual. 37 The court in Gihring v. ]iutcher denied plaintiff's recovery
on the same point in the Rickey test.38 The Gihring case involved
the suicide of a man undergoing treatment for depression.3 9 When
he took his life by carbon monoxide poisoning, the wife filed suit,
asking the court to find an exception to Rickey for malpractice.4 °
The court held that the wife was not within the zone of danger required by Rickey. " '
In addition to those applications of Rickey, Illinois courts have
held that the zone of danger test applies equally to a bystander
plaintiff and a direct victim of negligence. 2 The reason for this
change in the vernacular was a recognition by the court that the
recovery really lies with victims of negligence, not mere bystanders. ' Thus, Illinois law on emotional distress is a strict application
of the Rickey test.
THE CASE FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON CORPSE MISHANDLING

The fact that Illinois does not allow a cause of action for emotional distress based on the negligent mishandling of a corpse does
not necessarily preclude recovery in this scenario. As long ago as
44
1914, in Mensinger v. O'Hara,
Illinois allowed recovery for psychic
injury when the deceased's husband sued undertakers for cutting off
the deceased's hair without plaintiff's knowledge, thereby rendering
34. Id. at 555, 457 N.E.2d at 5.
35. Id.
36. Villamil v. Elmhurst Memorial Hospital, 175 Ill. App. 3d 668, 529 N.E.2d
1181 (1988).
37. Id.
38. Gihring v. Butcher, 138 Ill. App. 3d 976, 487 N.E.2d 75 (1985).
39. Id. at 978, 487 N.E.2d at 76.
40. Id. at 979, 487 N.E.2d at 77.
41. Id.
42. Robbins v. Kass, 163 Ill. App. 3d 927, 516 N.E.2d 1023 (1987).
43. Id. at 930, 516 N.E.2d at 1025, (citing Courtney v. St. Joseph Hosp., 149 11.
App. 3d 397, 500 N.E.2d 703 (1986)).
44. 189 I1. App. 48 (1914).
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the body unfit for viewing. The Mensinger court observed that the
law recognized an exclusive right of the next of kin' to possession of
the remains absent contrary testamentary disposition.4 6 The court
held that "any wilful or wanton infringement of this recognized legal
right, by the intentional mutilation of the body of the deceased, will
subject the wrongdoer to an action on the case for [emotional distress] damages. . . .""' As precedent, however, Mensinger applies

only to cases of intentional infliction of emotional distress, where
recovery is more difficult to obtain."'
In the corpse mismanagement setting, a plaintiff may also recovery under a breach of contract theory. In the 1948 case of Chelini
v. Nieri,'8 recovery under a breach of contract theory was obtained
when the defendant mortician promised that the decedent's body
would keep "almost forever," but in fact the body disintegrated. 9 In
the cases referred to in the introduction to this article, misdelivery
of ashes and negligent embalming, breach of contract actions were
allowed. However, although emotional distress damages can be obtained in contract actions, contract damages may not be sufficient
restitution for the psychic injury received in the corpse mismanagement setting.50
A number of jurisdictions have already recognized a cause of
action for infliction of emotional distress due to negligent mishandling of a corpse. In Gammon v. Osteopathic Hospital of Maine, 1
45. Id. at 53-54.
46. Id. at 54.
47. See McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 533 N.E.2d 806 (1988) (conduct must
be truly extreme and outrageous, defendant must intend to cause severe emotional
distress or know of a high probability the conduct would cause severe emotional distress, and the conduct does in fact cause emotional distress).
For an example of the type of extreme and outrageous conduct that has led to
recovery of emotional damages for intentionally inflicted emotional distress in the
corpse mismanagement setting, see Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1976)
(defendant mortician falsely advised deceased's family member that a more expensive
casket need be purchased due to offensive odor of deceased and that deceased body
was too gruesome for viewing, and mortician failed to comply with cemetery procession instructions).
48. 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196 P.2d 915 (1948).
49. Id. at 484, 196 P.2d at 919.
50. In Illinois, damages for breach of contract causing emotional injury will only
be awarded where the breach was wanton or reckless and caused bodily harm or
where defendant had reason to know at the time of contracting that the breach would
cause mental suffering for non-pecuniary reason. Maere v. Churchill, 116 Ill. App. 3d
939, 944, 452 N.E.2d 694, 697 (1983).
In the case of Von Seggren v. Smith, 151 Ill. App. 3d 813, 503 N.E.2d 573 (1987),
emotional damages were awarded where a funeral home delivered the wrong person's
cremated ashes to the plaintiff.
See also Doe v. Lamb, No. 88 L. 16692 (1st Dist. Ill. September 8, 1988) (though
the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress was dismissed, a breach of contract claim was allowed).
51. 534 A.2d 1282 (Me. 1987).
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the plaintiff sued for emotional injury damages when, due to a hospital and funeral home's negligence, a pathological specimen (a severed leg) was delivered to plaintiff with plaintiff's deceased father's
personal effects. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that defendants were liable in negligence because they reasonably should
have foreseen that their negligence would cause plaintiff emotional
distress.5 2 In a New York case, Thompson v. Duncan Bros. Funeral
Home, 53 plaintiff's son's body was displayed to plaintiff and her
family. Due to negligent embalming, the remains were decomposed,
leaking fluid and were odiferous5 4 The New York court held that
the next of kin had a cause of action for mental anguish damages
resulting from the negligent preparation of the body for burial.6 5 In
Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens,5 a West Virginia court
held that the defendant was liable for negligently or intentionally
losing the remains of plaintiff's deceased family members, and
57
mental anguish alone was a sufficient basis for recovery.
Other authority than case law exists for the proposition that a
cause of action should be recognized for emotional distress damages
caused by the negligent mishandling of a corpse. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts provides that "[o]ne who intentionally, recklessly
or negligently removes, withholds, mutilates or operates on the body
of a dead person or prevents its proper interment or cremation is
subject to liability to a member of the family of the deceased who is
entitled to the disposition of the body."58 Also, a learned treatise
argues for a cause of action in negligence in this setting.5"
In the 1986 case of Courtney v. Saint Joseph Hospital,6" an Illinois Appellate court faced the issue whether to allow a cause of action for emotional distress damages resulting from the negligent
mishandling of a corpse. In Courtney, a widow sued the hospital
when the hospital morgue's refrigeration unit malfunctioned, thus
leaving plaintiff's deceased husband's body in an unsuitable condition for an open casket wake and funeral. 1
52. Id. at 1285.
53. 455 N.Y.S. 2d 324, 116 Misc. 2d 227 (1982).
54. Id. at 325, 116 Misc. 2d at 229.
55. Id. at 326, 116 Misc. 2d at 230.
56. 327 S.E.2d 438 (W. Va. 1985).
57. Id. at 443. See also Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass'n, 33 Ohio App. 3d
31, 514 N.E.2d 430 (1986)(negligent infliction of emotional distress allowed). But see
District of Columbia v. Smith, 436 A.2d 1294 (D.C. App. 1981)(no negligence action
allowed if no physical injury).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1979). The official commentary
notes that in reality, such a cause of action "has been exclusively one for the mental
distress" and that "[t]here is no need to show physical consequences of the mental
distress." Id.
59. See W. PROSSER AND W. KEATON, supra note 20, at 54.
60.. 149 111.App. 3d 397, 500 N.E.2d 703 (1986).
61. Id. at 397, 500 N.E.2d at 703.
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The court found that no Illinois cases allowing such a cause of
action existed. 2 The Courtney court observed that Illinois courts
had strictly construed the Rickey zone of danger test, and because
the plaintiff in Courtney did not allege that she was in a zone of
danger and feared for her own safety, the Rickey rules foreclosed
her cause of action in negligence. The court in Courtney, however,
reviewed the authority which supports a cause of action in these situations. The court confessed that "[w]ere we writing on a clean
slate, we would be inclined to permit the complaint in this case to
stand."6
The Courtney court's reluctance to deny recovery was wellfounded. The area of emotional distress in tort law has been described as "rife with disorder, inconsistency, and complexity." 5 The
trend in this area of the law has clearly been to expand liability for
negligent conduct which causes emotional distress. An examination
of relevant policy issues suggests that Illinois courts should follow
the lead of other jurisdictions and facilitate recovery for negligently
caused emotional distress in corpse mismanagement settings.6
A number of courts have hesitated to expand liability for emotional injury due to medical science's assumed inability to prove
causation between the negligent conduct and the emotional injuries
sustained. 7 Relatedly, courts have also expressed concern that the
damages sustained in these types of cases are too speculative.6 6 With
respect to other areas of psychic injury, however, such as pain and
suffering, the law has abandoned these concerns. Moreover, a number of courts have noted that medical science has become increasingly sophisticated in evaluating emotional injuries and their effects. 9 An Illinois court, in recognizing the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, observed that the argument that
medical science could not prove emotional injury was "losing its ef62. Id. at 399, 500 N.E.2d at 704.
63. Id. at 403, 500 N.E.2d at 707.
64. Id. at 401, 500 N.E.2d at 705.
65. Twiford, Emotional Distress in Tort Law, 3 BEHAV. SCL & THE LAW 121, 121
(1985).
66. If Illinois should adopt a test based on foreseeability of emotional harm, of
course, recovery in the corpse mismanagement situation, as well as many other settings of negligently caused emotional distress, would be facilitated. For an argument
that Illinois should adopt a foreseeability test, see McCarthy, Illinois Law in Distress: The "Zone of Danger" and "Physical Injury" Rules in Emotional Distress Litigation, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 17 (1985).
67. See generally Leubsdorf, Remedies for Uncertainty, 61 B.U.L. REV. 132

(1982).
68. See generally Liebson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress
Caused by Physical Injury to Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163 (1976-77).

69. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975) (physical and
psychological injury are inextricably intertwined).
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fectiveness." 70 Consistency demands that this argument should not
deter Illinois from allowing recovery where the defendant causes
emotional distress negligently, as opposed to intentionally.
Courts have also voiced concern that allowing damages for negligently caused emotional distress would result in a "flood-tide" of
litigation." This oft-used argument to deny a cause of action completely fails to address the merits of a cause of action, and runs
counter to settled tort principles of restitution for injury wrongly
caused. Further, no flood of litigation has occurred since emotional
distress damages have been recoverable in tort law, 2 and it can
hardly be maintained that corpse mismanagement is so pervasive in
Illinois that suits arising therefrom will burden the Illinois court
system.
Another reason courts have hesitated to expand liability for
emotional injuries is the fear that the liability courts impose on defendants will be excessive. Importantly, in the area of emotional distress damages, this concern has been discredited. Judges and juries
should be trusted to define reasonable liability on a case-by-case basis, with assistance from experts if necessary. 4
Underlying these numerous concerns is a fear that plaintiffs will
initiate fraudulent claims. 5 In settings of corpse-mismanagement,
however, this fear is unfounded. Where a loved one has passed away,
the next of kin undoubtedly experiences an emotionally difficult
time. The "especial likelihood of genuine and serious emotional distress, arising from the special circumstances, [serves] as a guarantee
that the claim is not spurious."7 "
70. Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 85, 174 N.E.2d 157, 164 (1961)(Illinois recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
71. See Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L.R.R. Co. 147 Pa. 40, 23 A. 340 (1892) (if
fright without physical bodily injury is an allowed cause of action, "accident cases"
scope will become greater).
72. As one judge stated: "Ever since MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (217 N.Y.
382) was decided more than half a century ago, there has been expanding recognition
that the argument concerning unlimited liability is of no merit, yet the aberrations
persist." Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1969)
(Keating, J., dissenting).
73. See Finkelstein, Pickrel & Glasser, The Death of Children: A
Nonparametric Statistical Analysis of Compensation of Anguish, 74 COLUM. L. REV.
884 (1974).
74. Twiford, supra note 65, at 127.
75. A number of courts, however, have observed that fear of fraudulent litigation is not a proper basis to deny recovery of damages as an initial matter for concern. See, e.g., Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 134, 447 N.E.2d 109,
112 (1983) (problem is one of adequate proof, and judicial system and evidentiary
safeguards are sufficient to address this); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 161, 404 A.2d
672, 680 (1979) ("factual, legal, and medical charlatans are unlikely to emerge from a
trial unmasked").
76. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, supra note 20, at 362.
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CONCLUSION

Since its inception in the law, the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress has undergone a great many changes. Illinois has
been slow to follow national trends of expanding liability in this
area. Illinois' zone of danger rule effectively precludes an action for
negligently caused emotional distress arising from the mishandling
of a corpse. Because the family of a negligently mishandled decedent
is likely to suffer genuine emotional injury, Illinois courts should
make an exception to the zone of danger rule, and allow plaintiffs in
this setting to state a cause of action where traditional requirements
of tort liability are present.

